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The Gulf War 1990-1991 and the study of
international relations*
FRED HALLIDAY
Introduction: IR and the contemporary era
The Gulf crisis of 1990-1991 was, by any standards, one of the more significant
international crises of the post-1945 epoch.1 It involved the mobilization of around
one million armed men, the diplomatic involvement of much of the international
community, and a war that, for all its limited character, was a significant case of
inter-state conflict. In what follows I do not want to dwell on the actual course of
this war or to examine in detail specific aspects of the history, not least because the
broad outline of what happened is already well known.2 I do, however, want to
look at this conflict in broader perspective, and from two vantage points in
particular, each pertinent to the study of international relations (IR).
First I would like, with the benefit of at least a little hindsight, to ask some
questions about the significance of this war, and how, in retrospect, our evaluation
of it may already have shifted. The other, more extended vantage point from which
I would like to examine the war is that of the question of its implications for the
study of international relations as an academic discipline. Here we often encounter
two problems, two forms of reserve. On the one hand, many people, including
practitioners and general readers of the press, doubt whether there is any need for
an academic discipline of IR at all, or assume that it is just commentary, with a bit
* This essay is based on the tenth annual E.H. Carr Memorial Lecture delivered at the University of
Wales, Aberystwyth, in May 1993. E.H. Carr was Woodrow Wilson Professor of International
Politics there from 1936 to 1947.
1
 The analysis presented here draws on a wide range of discussions held during and after the Gulf
War. in the United Kingdom, in the United States and the Middle East. I am particularly grateful
to the participants in the one-day seminar 'The Gulf War and International Relations' held at the
International Relations Department of the London School of Economics and Political Science on
16 June 1992: Falih Abd al-Jabir, Michael Donelan, Lawrence Freedman, Christopher Hill, Efraim
Karsh, Ken Matthews, Michael Rustin, Steven Smith, and Paul Taylor. Several publications by
them are referred to in subsequent notes.
2
 Of the multitude of books on the crisis, the following are amongst the most informative and
judicious: Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991, Diplomacy and War
in the New World Order (London, 1993); Ken Matthews The Gulf Conflict and International
Relations (London 1993); John Bulloch and Harvey Morris, The Origins of the Kuwait Conflict and
the International Response (London, 1991). Freedman and Karsh are especially good on Western
decision-making, Matthews is exemplary on the analytic implications for IR.
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of historical and moral depth, on current affairs. Those of us who work in the field
of IR theory are forever being hectored by philistines who tell us that there is no
need for concepts in such a field. But, one may ask, where were the men of reality
on the night of 2 August 1990, when Saddam was occupying Kuwait? Asleep in
Surrey, or about to go to sleep in Arlington, Virginia, or Bethesda, Maryland, is
the answer. Our justification must be not that we can predict but that, beyond any
insights we can cast on events contemporary or historical, we can bring out some
of the underlying issues, analytic and moral, that are posed by international
politics.
On the other hand, and in part because of this public depreciation, and the perils
of commentary on current affairs, there is always the temptation to argue that IR
as a discipline has no need to respond to the immediate. But like all other social
sciences, it is related, and should recognize itself as such, to contemporary events
and concerns, if not immediately, then mediately, in an engaged but independent,
and critical, way. The whole history of social science is indeed one of intellectual
activity, whether taught in a university or not, proceeding by some response, be it
critical, outraged, or collusive, to events in the real world; IR is not, and should
not be, any different. Economics began as a reflection on problems of trade and the
industrial revolution; sociology as a response to urbanization; political science in
reaction to democratization and problems of governance; geography as a reflection
on the rise of a world market and of empire; psychology in response to a new
awareness of mental illnesses. In our case the academic origins lie, in Aberystwyth
above all where the first department of international relations in Britain (and
probably the first department in the world) was established, in the response to
World War I and as a reflection, mediate but engaged, on why the efforts
of diplomats, lawyers, peace campaigners, industrialists, feminists, working-class
leaders and the rest, had not been able to stop the slaughter of 1914-1918. The
challenge facing us, as much as for any social scientists, is to decide on what, in the
established tradition, is pertinent, and where new problems are posed: there is
much in Machiavelli, Kant, Marx, even Woodrow Wilson that is relevant to-day;
there are also developments that prompt a modicum of rethinking.
Retrospection
Many claims were made at the time as to the implications of this crisis for the
international system as a whole, and for the Middle East in particular: some of
these at least would seem to require retrospective qualification. Here I would like
to address four of the broad issues that were so raised.
In the first place, this war had little or nothing to do with something called 'a
New International Order'. This was a phrase used by US President George Bush at
the time, but he stopped using it soon afterwards; indeed, the only people to go on
using it were critics of US and Western policy looking for a convenient object to
attack. Bush's 'order' was supposed to refer in part to relations between states, and
the prevention of aggression, and in part to the situation within states, and the
promotion of democracy. The former was a major component of the war effort, the
latter only secondarily so: in this sense, the Western response was not 'new' at all,
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but a relatively consistent part of the post-1945 international system. Much was
made of the issue of 'double standards' in regard to the Western defence of Kuwait,
but the defence of an established sovereign state against full annexation by another
state was a relatively rare event.3 Insofar as the 'new' order meant anything, it
referred to the situation that prevailed from 1988, and for most of 1989, in which
the two superpowers, formerly at odds with each other in the Cold War, sought to
solve a range of Third World conflicts in which they had previously been on
opposing sides. These included the Arab-Israeli dispute, Afghanistan, Cambodia,
Namibia, Nicaragua, El Salvador and the Horn of Africa. If one can say about
these efforts that they had some success, they were not characteristic of a 'new', let
alone more orderly, international system, for three reasons: first, because some of
the problems were not liable to solution at this time and continued;4 secondly,
because the collapse of the Soviet Union as a global power in 1990-1 meant that
one pillar of the new order was gone; and thirdly, because, with the collapse of
communism and of the control, unwelcome as it may have been, which the Cold
War brought to international relations, a whole range of new regional problems
emerged which no amount of great power involvements seemed able to resolve—
most notably the Balkans, and Transcaucasia.
A second general judgement on the Gulf War came from critics of the war who,
rightly suspicious of the hegemonic import in the term 'New World Order' and
aware that the US was now acting largely unchallenged, saw the Gulf crisis as
presaging more unrestrained US aggression and intervention and the re-
establishment of US hegemony over its allies.5 Here, whatever the justice of their
particular judgements on the US role in the Kuwait crisis, the critics mistook the
broader direction of international relations. US public opinion, and Congress in
particular, while in the end generally supportive of the Gulf policy, did not favour a
greater international military role for the United States and, as demonstrated in the
1992 presidential elections, wanted to turn away from international involvements
and related expenditures towards a concentration to US domestic politics. For many
involved in other crises, most notably the Balkans, the problem became not too
much but too little US involvement, whether diplomatic, military or financial.
Further US military interventions in the Third World could not be ruled out, but
the removal of the Cold War context, and the rising alarm at domestic issues, made
the United States less, not more, interventionist. As for strengthening the US
Post-1945 history has several instances of states being annexed by more powerful neighbours, but
at the moment at which they became independent: Palestine, partitioned by Israel and Jordan in
1948-9, Western Sahara and East Timor in 1975, Bosnia in 1992. Tibet in 1949-50 was a possible
further candidate in that one can assume it would have organized itself to acquire international
diplomatic recognition, following the British departure from India in 1947, if a little more time had
elapsed.
Thus the conflicts in Afghanistan, Angola, Mozambique, Cyprus all defied such international
resolution.
For representative views, see Michah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf (eds.), The Gulf War Reader:
History, Documents, Opinions (New York, 1991); John Gittings (ed.), Beyond the Gulf War, The
Middle East and the New World Order (London, 1991); Victoria Brittain (ed.), The Gulf Between
Us: Gulf War and Beyond (London, 1991); Haim Bresheeth and Nira Yuval-Davis (eds.), The Gulf
War and the New World Order (London, 1991). Among the most persuasive critics of the war were
Noam Chomsky, whose analysis is in both the Sifry and Cerf and the Bresheet and Yuval-Davis
volumes, and Regis Debray, 'La Guerre en proces', Le Nouvel Observateur, No. 1371, 14—20 Feb.
1991, pp. 41-51.
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position vis a vis its commercial competitors, there is little evidence that Washington
gained anything, beyond the $55 billions of cash to pay for the war itself, from its
efforts over Kuwait. There may have been a small combat charge, a contemporary
form of seigniorage rake-off, but in the broader pattern of things it was not much.
A third broad conclusion drawn at the time was that this war represented in
some sense the start of a new, or in other ways revived, global conflict between the
'West' and a new enemy, 'Islam', i.e. a new version of the Crusades. Saddam
Hussein certainly sought to mobilize Islamic sentiment behind him, calling for jihad
and placing the Islamic credo la Allah ila Allah ('there is no God but God') on the
Iraqi flag;6 many who warned against taking military action prior to January 1991
did so on the grounds that it could irrevocably exacerbate relations between the
West and the Arab and Islamic peoples. Here too closer examination reveals a less
neat picture. First of all, Saddam's regime was hardly in the forefront of Islamic
radicalism, having fought revolutionary Islamic Iran for eight years and having
persecuted the opposition clergy at home.7 The two main rivals for leadership of
the Islamic world, Saudi Arabia and Iran, both distanced themselves from Iraq,
and even Iran, while unwilling formally to back the US intervention, denounced
Baghdad and ensured that its followers took a neutral stance during the war. There
was a considerable amount of pro-Iraqi sentiment in the Arab world and elsewhere,
but this had as much if not more to do with nationalistic opposition to a Western
military intervention in a Third World area as it had to do with religion: pro-Iraq
sentiment was probably as high in predominantly Hindu and increasingly anti-
Islamic India as it was in, say, Egypt or Algeria. On the Western side, there has
been a lot of loose talk about a new war with 'Islam', but this is largely nonsense,
if not the self-interested exaggeration of arms salesmen and defence experts. The
'West', i.e. the group of developed democracies, as such does not need an enemy,
in communism, Islam or anything else, and its historic dynamic, if there is one, has
been to make the whole world homogeneous. Marxists who argue for the West's
need of a foe would do well to re-read the Communist Manifesto; capitalism's
destructive dynamic lies in its knocking down Chinese walls, in making the whole
world like itself. If there is a Third World threat to-day it is much more from rising
industrial powers in the Far East and Latin America than in the Islamic world. It
is often forgotten too that for much of the 1980s when the United States, and more
specifically the CIA, was involved in its largest ever covert operation, this was in
support of Islamist forces in Afghanistan.
Finally, the war was seen at the time as a turning point in the history of the
modern Middle East. Subsequently, it has been claimed that the war was the most
important event since the collapse of the Ottoman empire.8 The particular ways in
On the Islamic dimension, see Gilles Kepel, 'La carte islamique de Saddam Hussein', Le Monde, 11
January 1991; Jean-Michel Dumay, 'La "guerre sainte" comme arme ideologique', Le Monde,
20-21 January 1991; Fred Halliday 'The Fractured umma: Islamist Movements, Social Upheaval
and the Gulf War', The Oxford International Review, 2, no. 3 (1991), pp. 28-32; George Joffe,
'Middle Eastern Views of the Gulf Conflict and its Aftermath', Review of International Studies, 19
(1993), pp. 177—99. For a position opposed to Saddam Hussein from within an Islamic perspective,
see Ghazi Algosaibi, The Gulf Crisis: An Attempt to Understand (London, 1993).
On the Islamic opposition to Saddam, see Hanna Batatu, 'Shici Organisation in Iraq: al-Dacwah
al-Islamiyah and al-Mujahidin', in Juan Cole and Nikki Keddie (eds.), Shfism and social Protest
(New Haven, 1986).
Bassam Tibi, Conflict and War in the Middle East, 1967-91 (London, 1993), p. 165.
The Gulf War 1990-1991 and the study of international relations 113
which it was new, or marked a new era for the region, were, however, not at first
clear. It certainly was new in the coalition it produced: for the first time the armies
of Arab states seriously fought another Arab state, and, although masked by
decades of rhetoric about the US role, this was the first time US forces had in any
significant way actually engaged in combat in the region. It also marked a further
step in the decline of an effective, political, pan-Arab nationalism. If it gave an
impulsion to a general sense of Islamic grievance the latter had many other,
ongoing causes, notably socio-economic conditions within states. Some of the
expectations raised at the time were not, however, borne out: the Iraqi regime,
although weakened, did not fall; the Palestinians, although apparently alienated
from both Gulf Arabs and the West by their sympathy for Iraq, were soon and
most unexpectedly involved in the Madrid peace negotiations. As far as the Arab
states of the Gulf themselves are concerned, there was some political change,
evident in the elections in Kuwait and in a somewhat more overt opposition in
Saudi Arabia, Oman and Bahrain.9 Yet in these states, the margin of political
freedom remained small and was still shrouded in evasive invocations by the ruling
families of supposedly different 'Islamic', 'Arab' or 'tribal' political traditions. Yet
here, as in assessing the impact on Iraq, too little time has elapsed. It would be
premature to regard the political changes in these countries as merely face-saving
since the political effects of wars take many years to work themselves out. It is
worth remembering that the introduction of universal adult franchise, promised in
World War I, was only achieved in Britain in 1928.
More serious, because more explosive, was the failure of the victors to create a
new system of economic or military security in the Gulf: Iran was isolated, and
soon turned antagonistic; oil prices fell, creating greater popular rancour; the
regimes and their no wiser Western allies resorted to the oldest and most
short-sighted of security policies, namely the flooding of the region with weaponry
that threatened to destabilize the fragile balance and provoke greater anxiety;10
most importantly of all, the fact that the regime of Saddam Hussein remained in
power meant that there was all the likelihood of a major confrontation in and with
Iraq in the future. We should not erect unreasonable criteria or expectations here:
wars do not, as Michael Howard has reminded us, tend to solve problems, they
only prevent things from getting worse. The Gulf War would seem, in regional
terms, to have been of this kind, with one further, major and most unexpected
consequence, namely that it gave the impulsion to both Washington and Israel, and
also, through a desire to end their isolation, to the Palestinians, to engage
in meaningful negotiations. One can no more say on this—than one can on
democratization of the Gulf states—that it would lead anywhere, but at least
something had been initiated. On the regional security and oil fronts, however, the
worst lessons seemed to have learnt, and unnecessarily so.
Roger Hardy, Arabia after the Storm: Internal Stability of the Gulf Arab States (London, 1992);
Mary Ann Tetrault, 'Kuwait: The Morning After', Current History, no. 91 (January 1992). pp.
6-10; Fred Halliday, 'The Arabian Peninsula in the Aftermath of the Gulf War',
Viertelsjahresberichte (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Bonn) no. 133, September 1993, pp. 297-302.
1
 On post-war arms flows to the area, see Saferworld Foundation, The Middle East Peace Process
and the Arms Trade: A Fatal Contradiction? (Bristol, 1992); and Yahya Sadowski, 'Scuds vs. Butter:
The Political Economy of Arms Control in the Arab world', Middle East Report, no. 177
(July/August 1992), pp. 2-13.
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Analysing the war
Concerning the war itself, there are a number of issues on which, in retrospect,
some more accurate assessment may now be possible. Here I would mention four
issues, which I shall discuss briefly, if only to show how our thinking can change in
retrospect. These are: the causes of the Iraqi intervention, the issue of diplomatic
alternatives to war during the five-month interlude, the character of the combat
period, and the post-war policy of the allies towards Baghdad.
Assessment of why Iraq invaded Kuwait was central to public debate at the time
because it was intertwined with the discussion of the rights and wrongs, to which I
shall come later. It was, for example, argued that since the West had in the past
armed Saddam Hussein, this implied complicity and so it was inadmissible now to
oppose him. Alternatively, it was claimed that the failure to give him clear warning,
in particular through the US ambassador in Baghdad meeting with him on 25 July,
meant that the West had in some way or another led him into a trap. Neither of
these is a very substantial argument: prior support does not invalidate later
opposition; there is a world of difference between a guarded diplomatic exchange,
with the ambassador acting under instructions, and a conspiracy or green light.11
Yet it is important to look at what the motives were. Saddam gave, at various
times, four reasons: that there had been a popular uprising in Kuwaiti requesting
help from 'brotherly' Iraq; that Kuwait had damaged Iraq's economic interests by
taking oil from the Iraqi part of the Rumaila oilfield and exceeding its OPEC
quota, thus lowering the price of oil; that the border between the two states was
wrongly drawn; that Kuwait itself had no legal status and was historically on Iraqi
territory, its nineteenth province. That these arguments were contradictory did not
stop Baghdad from making them. Yet other reasons were almost certainly present:
Iraq's need to offset its rising internal debt of up to $80 billions by seizing the
assets of Kuwait; the impasse in which Iraqi politics had found itself as a result of
Iran's failure to make concessions after the August 1988 ceasefire; Saddam's fear
that the United States and the Soviet Union were conspiring to remove him, as
they had Ceaucescu in Rumania some months before; the opportunity for Arab
leadership and domination of the Gulf which the disarray over Palestine and Iran's
prostrate military condition provided. There is no reason to think any one of these
was decisive, and the decision to occupy Kuwait, based on a long-standing claim
and with contingency plans for occupation well in place, could have been taken at
the last moment, as could equally his decision to invade Iran in September 1980.l2
Whatever calculations were involved, this was not the decision of a madman, and
it draws attention to something almost wholly ignored in the discussion of the war,
namely the political background within Iraq. Indeed, throughout the crisis there
was virtually no discussion in the media, including the serious press, of what kind
of country Iraq was, what its long-run political strategies were and, not least, what
11
 Transcript of the April Glaspie interview in Sifry and Cerf (eds.), The Gulf War Reader, pp. 122-33.
The mixed signals contained in this interview lie at the heart of several critiques of US policy,
notably Pierre Salinger and Eric Laurent, Secret Dossier, The Hidden Agenda Behind the Gulf War
(London, 1991).
12
 We have no first-hand evidence, written or oral, on Saddam's decision-making and a final
judgement would have to wait until any such material is made available, an unlikely eventuality.
For a perceptive surmise about Saddam's impulsiveness in invading Iran, see Samir al-Khalil, The
Republic of Fear (London, 1988), pp. 271-2.
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was involved in the history and ideology of its ruling body, the Arab Bacth
Socialist Party.13 Failure to discuss this was like not discussing the ideology of
communism when assessing Soviet foreign policy, for Bathism tells us as much as
anything about this war and its outcome. Relevant features include its dramatic
idea of the Arab nation, its cult of war as the purgative fire, its glorification of
sharaf or honour, its obsession with the strong man—the knight or faris on
horseback—who will deliver the Arab nation, and its explicit valorization of
al-qiswa, harshness, as a tool of government control. In assessing the broader
motives, most commentators have inclined towards emphasis on the internal,
economic, causes of Saddam's gamble; this may need to be balanced with an equal
emphasis on the international dimension, and particularly that of relations with
Iran. Indeed, if there is a moment when the Kuwait crisis began it may not be in
the bungled negotiations of June and July 1990, or in Saddam's address to the
Arab Cooperation Council in February 1990, but the death of Khomeini in June
1989. After the August 1988 ceasefire, Iraq blocked negotiations with Iran in the
apparent hope that pressure would force Iran to concede. The mass outpouring of
grief, and the swift establishment of a new, effective, government team in Tehran
after the Ayatollah's death demonstrated as nothing else could have done that the
Iranian regime was solid and would not submit to Saddam's blandishments. The
great gamble on Iran, that Iraqi pressure could force it to submit, had failed; the
new gamble, on Kuwait, was to take its place.14
The second historical question is in many ways the most controversial of the
whole conflict, namely whether alternative outcomes were possible. An alternative
was possible before 2 August 1990: Saddam thought he could get away with it, and
so, in a different way, did the Kuwaiti leaders;15 both could with clearer signalling
have been told otherwise. In particular, Western inattention and wishful thinking,
abetted by the credulousness of Egyptian president Mubarak, who was told by
Saddam that no military action was intended, must bear great responsibility for
what happened; a timely set of diplomatic messages, backed by a show of force,
would probably have deterred Saddam. The wrong signals were sent, as much here
as in the Korean or Falklands cases. On the other hand, and in contrast to the
views of many critics of the war, it would seem that no alternative was possible
thereafter, other than simple acceptance of Saddam's occupation of Kuwait and, as
a consequence, of his military predominance in the Gulf. Those who argue against
the launching of the allied offensive can certainly put this case: lives would have
been saved, and the appearance of a new imperialism would have been precluded.
But other consequences would certainly have followed: Saddam would have
exploited his victory, half or more of the world's oil supplies would have been
under his control, Kuwait would have been destroyed, and the demonstration effect
elsewhere in the world considerable, as no small country would have felt secure; in
13
 On Bacthist ideology and the role of the Syrian nationalist Sati Al-Husri in transmitting European
fascist and nationalist ideas to the Arab world, see al-Khalil, Republic of Fear, and Efraim Karsh
and Inari Rautsi, Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography (London, 1991).
14
 One indication of this shift in Iraqi thinking after June 1989 comes from the information on arms
purchases revealed by the Matrix-Churchill affair: a year of relatively slack demand after the 1988
ceasefire gave way to a much more determined pace of arms procurement in the last part of 1989
and early 1990.
15
 On the calculations and miscalculations of the Kuwaiti royal family, see my interview with
opposition leader Ahmad al-Khatib, The Guardian, 19 January 1991.
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such states as Taiwan, Singapore, Papua New Guinea, Israel, Belize, to name but
some, the lesson would have been drawn.
However, the main plank of the anti-war argument rests not on the argument for
accepting the fait accompli, although a few were quick to do so by comparing
Saddam favourably with the al-Sabah, but on the belief that diplomatic pressure,
plus sanctions, could have resolved the crisis: peace should have been 'given a
chance'. Many attempts at a negotiated settlement were made, most notably in the
speech of President Mitterrand to the UN General Assembly in September. Dozens
of mediators—Arab and non-Arab, ending up with the Secretary General of the
UN—went to see Saddam. On their side, the allies more than once said they would
accept a peaceful withdrawal. Others hoped that over a year or two sanctions
would do the trick; they claim the coalition went to war too quickly. Both
judgements can be contested, though such an argument must necessarily be
counter-factual. A decent time was given for negotiations, and Saddam simply
refused the way out. His treatment of the last-minute mission of the UN Secretary
General, made to wait for several hours while Saddam conversed with the leader of
the Japanese Socialist Party, and then treated to a historical discourse, and the
similar treatment of many other mediators, demonstrates this. His behaviour can
be explained by one simple reason: Saddam did not believe the Americans would
actually attack. He raised some other objections: that his army would not allow it,
that the allies would attack after he withdrew, or that at least Israel would do so.
These were not trivial concerns, but the main reason was his refusal, born of
miscalculation, that no retreat was necessary. The diplomatic option was tried, and
it failed. Peace was given a chance.
As for sanctions, they presuppose a government willing enough, or vulnerable
enough, to bend. The general implications of this will be discussed later. In this case
Saddam was not willing to bend and did not bend even with the sanctions imposed
after the war, when he was in a much weaker position. He knew, and knows, that
his regime can survive sanctions, through belt-tightening, a massive boost of
domestic agricultural potential, and smuggling along the long frontiers with Turkey,
Iran and Syria.16 Sanctions could not have been expected to work in five months,
but that was not the point: the point was that he did not accept the message sent by
sanctions and, given the kind of political and strategic response which Saddam made
in those five months, sanctions would never have worked. The alternative was,
therefore, either to leave Saddam in Kuwait, or go to war. There was no third way.
There are those who argue that the allies, and particularly the United States, were
hoping they would be able to have a go at Saddam, and it would have been odd if
this consideration had not been around: the phrase used was that there would be 'no
golden bridge', no easy way out, for Iraq. But had Saddam taken the bridge that
was there, had he even effected a partial withdrawal, abandoning the populated
It was calculated that within a year of the end of the war Iraq had been able to organize a quite
effective smuggling trade with its neighbours, including the export, in road tankers, of up to
200,000 barrels of oil a day, and of considerable quantities of fertilizers and cement, especially to
Iran. Total income from these exports was in the region of $2 billions, compared to export earnings
of $ 15-20 billions before the war. While greatly reduced, these earnings none the less provided the
regime with a basic revenue.
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parts of Kuwait, the allies could probably not, in the face of their own public
opinion and of the international community, have gone to war.17
With regard to the third of the analytic issues, the nature of the combat period,
it can certainly be said that the Gulf combat itself was, as a war, a curious one: the
air campaign was almost wholly one-sided and unseen by the outside world, and
the land fighting lasted for a very short time—100 hours. In one sense, this was a
war of a historically familiar kind: a colonial war, with an enormous imbalance of
technology and casualties, more reminiscent of, say, the British occupation of Tibet
in 1904, when in one engagement hundreds of Tibetans died with four British
wounded, than of any post-World War II Third World war. In some respects it was
novel. In military terms, it was the first in which cruise missiles were used, and the
first in which tanks on the battlefield could communicate directly with headquarters
in their home country, via satellite. In human terms, it was the first in which
Western armies deployed women soldiers at the front line, and also the first in
which Western troops in the host country were forced to observe temperance—
trucks loaded with cool beer only appearing, as if miraculously, when the forces
crossed into Iraqi territory. On casualities some perceptions at the time were, in
retrospect, mistaken: Iraqi casualties, which were estimated at the time to be up to
200,000, were it later appeared a tenth or even twentieth of that.18 The level of
technology used was far less advanced than allied propaganda suggested, almost all
of it being conventional hardware of at least twenty-year vintage. Similarly the
military impact of Scud attacks was overstated. The most vaunted elements in the
US arsenal, the Patriot missile and the Stealth bomber, were far less effective than
initially claimed.19 Similarly the Scud missile attacks, while politically unnerving,
were of little military significance, and on a much lower level than comparable
Iraqi attacks on Iran in the 1980-8 war.20 At the same time, allied intelligence
about Iraq, although gathered in almost ideal conditions, was faulty, not least in its
gross underestimation of the number of Scuds possessed by Iraq.21
So far, some historical issues have been raised on which an element of
retrospection and hence proportion may be possible, and where the general tenor
A further argument against the war was that of those Americans who said it was not in the United
States' 'national interest' to go to war. Whatever its domestic merits this paid scant attention to the
international issues involved. For one example, a remarkably silly one, see Stephen Graubard, Mr
Bush's War (London, 1992).
On revised figures for Iraq casualties see The Independent 5 February 1992, and John Heidenrich,
'The Gulf War: How Many Iraqis Died?', Foreign Policy, 90 (Spring 1993), pp. 108-25. At the time
of the war both US and Iraqi officials lent credence to the idea of higher casualties, for opposed
political reasons—the former to intimidate Iraq, the latter to emphasize the perfidy of US action.
'The Gulf War Revisited: Armchair Generalship', The Economist, 2 May 1992. On the broader
assessment of US military capabilities and the dated character of the 'hi-tech' war, I am
particularly grateful to Kevin Michaels, MSc student at LSE 1990-1. As Michaels pointed out, the
balance of civilian to military technology had shifted dramatically over the past decades: the latest
technology was not now that of the military, but that in the civilian field—available in any high
street personal computer shop.
308 Scuds hit Iran in that conflict, as against 72 used in the Kuwait war, the former causing the
deaths of over 2,000 people. See Farhang Rajaee (ed.), The Iran—Iraq War: The Politics of
Aggression (Gainsville, 1993).
Part of the problem was the confusion between launchers and the larger number of missiles. The
Military Balance 1989-1990, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London,
gave the number of launchers as 36 Scud B with a presumably smaller number of the Abbas and
Husayn variety. It later transpired that Iraq had 890 Scud missiles (International Herald Tribune, 26
March 1993).
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accords with the earlier judgement that the Gulf war was not as original as was
thought at the time. There is, however, another, fourth, dimension on which claims
of originality and precedent may more accurately be made, and that concerns not
the war, but its aftermath. Saddam's regime survived but was faced after the war
with two forms of external pressure of a novel kind. One was the regime of
intrusive arms control and inspection instituted by the UN. The other, following on
the uprising within Iraq that followed the war, was the introduction of the safe
haven for the Kurds in the north which, in effect, put about a third of Iraq under
a Western protectorate and allowed the Kurds to exercise self-rule for the first time.
Both of these, although drawing on earlier practices and norms, were major new
developments in international relations, and constituted precedents in modern
international history. The normative implications of these policies will be returned
to later. Here I would only underline that perhaps the most important feature of
this war was not anything that happened prior to or in the course of the war itself,
but the forms of intervention, military and political, imposed on Iraq in its
aftermath.22
Issues in IR analysis
So far I have looked at the actual record of the war, and have tried to isolate
certain empirical issues, of assessment and fact, that were prominent at the time. I
would now like to look at some of the underlying and more and theoretical issues,
beginning first with the analytic, and then moving on to the normative.
The analytic issues raised by the Gulf crisis read like a roll call of a course in IR
theory: the causes of war, the functions of war in the international system, the
relation between domestic and international policies, and between military and
economic considerations, the roles of diplomacy, signalling, misperception, the
patterns of decision-making, the construction of inter-state alliances and domestic
coalitions, the functions of sanctions, the roles of the great powers, and of
international institutions, the role of ideology, and of the media.23
For students of decision-making and foreign policy analysis, there was much in
this war that was familiar and stimulating. Both sides had their share of mis-
perception, based on the historical experiences of past wars and on the workings of
groups that did not question their own assumptions. Saddam seems to have
thought the Americans would not fight because they had run away from Vietnam
in 1973 and from Beirut in 1983, the latter after 250 men killed. He also seems to
have imagined that the 'masses' of Kuwait, whoever they were, would welcome his
occupation. From all that we know of the milieu around Saddam, contradicting the
boss is not a low-risk strategy, and the diplomats and others with whom foreign
envoys were in touch, and who had some foreign experience—Tariq Aziz, Saadun
Hamadi, Nizar Hamdun and others—apparently were not part of the inner circle.24
22
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But there was misperception on the allied side as well: the allies were mistaken in
thinking Saddam would not invade, and, later, in expecting him to withdraw under
pressure. They also, as it turned out, had greatly underestimated some of his
military potential, including the number of Scuds Iraq possessed and its progress
on a nuclear bomb. Perhaps their greatest mistake was in expecting the regime to
fall after the defeat in Kuwait. Here Saddam outfoxed them all, for prior to the
war he led the Americans into a trap which they closed on themselves. By
brandishing chemical weapons, and then at the Baker-Aziz meeting in Geneva
extracting a threat by the United States to destroy him if they were used, he
lowered the risks of war enormously: he could be driven from Kuwait or even, as
he chose, withdraw most of his forces anyway, knowing the United States and its
allies would not pursue him. This was perhaps the fatal error which the allies
committed, and forces us to ask how far, in the end, Saddam really fought to
defend Kuwait at all.25
The issue of sanctions was also much debated, both before and after the war,
and, as we have seen forms an important part of the 'give peace a chance'
argument. The academic literature on sanctions makes abundantly clear that
sanctions rarely work to achieve their stated goal, namely to force a government to
reverse a particular policy: they did not get Ian Smith to back down on UDI, or
Brezhnev to leave Afghanistan. They serve to fulfil other goals, notably that of
sending a signal to the international community that a particular course of action
is reprehensible. This certainly occurred in the Kuwait case, though whether
sanctions alone would have done much to reassure Singapore or Belize one can
doubt. But what the academic literature perhaps underplays is that in some cases
sanctions can work not to change a policy, but to produce a change by under-
mining the regime as a whole, where such a government is vulnerable to popular
challenge. Examples of this include the sanctions against Iran in 1953 and against
the Popular Unity government in Chile in 1973;26 in both cases, Western sanctions
contributed to economic crises, which in turn led to military coups in which more
'acceptable' regimes came to power. But the point here is that these were
democratically elected and responsive governments; in other words, sanctions
worked against nice people, such as Muhammad Mosadiq and Salvador Allende.
Against Saddam, who had killed many thousands of his people, and who was
about to do so again in the face of the March uprising, such sanctions, even if
economically effective—which, as I have argued above, they could not have
been—would not have worked. Saddam was, and remained, very much not a nice
person.
The issue of the causes of the war was one of the subjects of greatest controversy
at the time. It is worth restating at the outset that there was no one single cause,
and no simple explanation, in terms of an individual or an accident, that
occasioned this war. All of the theoretical approaches or paradigms that have been
25
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debated within IR over the past two decades could claim with some justification to
be able to explain this war, but each also looks somewhat strained in the process.
The realists would see it as an example, if in the end not a very important one, of
inter-state conflict and of the continued importance of security issues in inter-
national affairs. They would stress the importance of the great powers, without
whom there is no international security and without whom nothing would have
been done in the Gulf case. At least they could argue that the Gulf War put an end
to the transnationalist claim about great powers not being able to use force in the
modern world, a claim based largely on the oft-repeated cases of Vietnam and
Afghanistan. The transnationalists would stress the importance of economic factors
on both sides—in impelling Saddam to invade, and in eliciting a Western response,
in defence of vital economic interests, namely oil. Equally they would point to the
importance of transnational ideologies—Arab nationalism, Islam, Third World
assertiveness—in the conflict, and of the growing communality of interest of the
developed countries who acted to defend what they saw as an international asset.
For many Marxists and structuralists, the war would present no problems: it was a
war between the dominant and subordinated in world politics, one motivated by
the crudest of material interests—oil—and justified on the West's side by a spurious
invocation of an international law and international interest defined to suit the
needs of the hegmonic powers. Martin Wight's application of this revolutionary
view of international law by Nazi Germany to the British and French, 'successful
burglars now trying to settle down as country gentlemen, making intermittent
appearances on the bench', was well exemplified in this crisis: the very arguments
used by Saddam to justify his action had been used by the Western states in
colonial times.27
This would bear out Thomas Kuhn's observation that any decent paradigm, any
'historically significant' theory, can come up with an explanation, 'more or less'.
Yet there are also what Kuhn has called anomalies here, which suggest that none
of the three paradigms can have it all its own way. If the realists presuppose
rationality and calculation of state interest, then they will find it very hard to
explain Iraq's actions, which must count, along with the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbour and the Anglo-French action at Suez, as among the major miscalculations
of the twentieth century. Equally, the role of pan-Arab and Islamic ties, and that
of economic factors, will strain their framework. The liberal and transnationalist
approach will in its turn have to revise some of its claims about the declining
salience of military power in international relations, and will also have to
recognize, rather more than it might like, that the UN acted as it did not out of
some common interest or universal commitment, but because one member, the
United States, cajoled, led and twisted the arms of the other members, those on the
Security Council in particular, to act as they did. China, for one, refrained from
exercising its veto not because it upheld the principle of Kuwaiti sovereignty but
because it got a payoff in the form of remission for the Tien An Men massacre of
the previous year. Equally, the assumption, implicit in much liberal and trans-
nationalist writing, that the end of hegemony and of great power domination is a
good thing, and that those who challenge it are more virtuous, would seem rather
27
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dented in the case of Iraq. Terrorism, the Mafia, racist movements and ethnic
cleansing are as much part of transnationalism as the more benign processes
commonly alluded to.28
The Marxist and structuralist approach might appear to have more to say on
this question, but it too has its drawbacks: if it was an 'imperialist' war, then the
implication must be that Saddam somehow reflected a more positive, and pro-
gressive, trend in international politics. Underlying this judgement is not only a
general conception of north—south relations, but also a view of historical develop-
ment, with states such as Iraq, brutal as they may be, somehow representing a
more 'progressive' level of development, at least in their anti-imperialism. This
teleological view of history, present in much liberal and revolutionary thought of
the past two centuries, has been challenged in recent years, and rightly so.29 The
whole idea of a historical progression, through appropriate states of liberation, had
taken rather a knock in Eastern Europe in 1989; it was hardly in good shape to
vindicate events of 1990 in the northern Gulf.30 But even if this teleology were
accepted in theory, Iraq was an uneasy candidate for such an emancipatory role: at
home it was brutal, far more so, than its monarchical neighbours: in inter-Arab
relations it used its oil money not to develop other states but to exploit their
migrant workers, particularly those from Egypt; the ideology of the Bacth party
invoked socialism but was at least as much derived from another strand of radical
European thought, namely fascism.
Equally present, and open to debate, within much of the structuralist discussion
of the war was the question of 'imperialism' itself: since the United States was an
imperialist country, and Iraq was opposed to it, it followed that the war was an
imperialist one, and hence illegitimate. But, apart from the question of whether
Iraq had not also in some sense been acting in an imperialist manner, this
presupposed the argument that everything imperialist countries do is historically
regressive and, by extension, morally bad. This had become the mainstay of much
left-wing and nationalist writing over the past two decades, but it is, as the late Bill
Warren so well pointed out, at variance with the view of Marx himself, who took
up a more two-sided and contingent attitude to the role of imperialism in world
economics and politics.31 The question, which Marx rightly posed, was what
imperialism was directed against. In terms of values, some of the norms of
developed (and imperialist) countries were preferable to those of the traditional
societies they conquered: the subaltern has no ethical primacy. In more general
terms, the briefest of surveys of twentieth-century history would suggest that,
whatever the motives, even the United States had done some good things, at least
by the criteria of most of those who criticized it in this war: Woodrow Wilson's
28
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support for national self-determination, the participation in the anti-Axis coalition,
to name but two. Again, whatever the motives, such more recent US initiatives as
diplomatic intervention to prevent a Pakistani—Indian nuclear war, support for
independence in Namibia, and the Madrid peace negotiations could count in this
way. What too often occurred was that an initially historical and materialist
critique of US foreign policy was replaced by an ahistorical and idealist one,
whereby the United States became the incarnation of a timeless world-wide evil.
Some of this was fuelled by European cultural anti-Americanism, some by the
courageous but rather static critique produced by opponents within the United
States.32 None of the three major paradigms of IR theory can, therefore, be said to
have emerged unscathed from this episode. What of post-modernism, regarded by
some as the 'fourth' paradigm? Its pretensions to explaining events, and providing
an alternative, non-ethnocentric, moral compass were rather strained.33 Rather
more substantial was the response of another theoretical contender, feminism:
several new insights on this war, and war in general, were provided, with regard to
the gendered dimensions of the war itself, the issue of women's combat role, and
the images or symbols involved. Yet with feminism, as with the three more
established paradigms, the war posed questions for concepts and values, as much
as it vindicated by example.34
Ethical issues
We can now turn to the other kind of issue raised by the war, and much discussed
at the time, namely the normative or ethical questions. Here I would like to discuss
three issues raised in the war and its aftermath about which the war highlighted
some difficulties for established thinking on the subject: sovereignty, intervention,
just war.35 It can also be suggested that even where the criteria were reasonably
applied, public discussion in the West suffered from a strong degree of historical
amnesia and self-righteousness. On the other hand, and despite many assertions
about the relative 'ethno-' or 'euro-centric' character of criteria invoked in Western
discussion, Iraq did not argue for an alternative set of standards. Its justifications,
32
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like those of Western critics of the war, were framed in the same terms as those of
the anti-Saddam coalition.
The issue of sovereignty lay at the heart of the debate on the war. Iraq
questioned the validity both of Kuwait's frontiers, which it claimed were artificial
and colonial, and of its legitimacy as a state; equally, in both Iraqi and some
Western critical discussion, the illegitimacy of the al-Sabah rulers of Kuwait was
given as a reason for denying Kuwait's sovereignty. Others, from pan-Arab
and Islamic but also from Western universalist positions, questioned whether
sovereignty should indeed be the primary or sole normative criterion for debating
international relations and hence whether even the most disinterested defence of
Kuwaiti sovereignty legitimated war.36 It is also worth noting that, in the bizarre
final twist to the crisis, Iraqi sovereignty was itself greatly infringed by the twin
policies of arms control and safe haven.
The two most common arguments against accepting the sovereignty of Kuwait in
particular would seem to me to be of little seriousness when looked at in general
terms. Kuwait's frontiers may well have been created artificially or by colonialism
or by force, but that goes for most of those in contemporary world. If Kuwait was,
on these criteria, an artificial and therefore illegitimate state, then so too was Iraq,
the product of an Anglo-French carve-up in 1918. Moreover Iraq's historic title to
Kuwait as a whole was, at best, debatable,37 and even if it had been a strong one it
would not have justified resort to arms. The question of the legitimacy of the
al-Sabah rulers is equally beside the point, since the legitimacy of a government or
some rulers vis a vis their own people is separate from the legitimacy of a state or
country vis a vis other states: the case of Poland in 1939, presided over by an
unsavoury albeit not very murderous military dictatorship, is an obvious analogy.
The only qualification is the humanitarian one, which is applicable where a state
exercises extreme tyranny, commits acts 'that shock the moral conscience of
mankind', and its people clearly want intervention. In such circumstances an
external state may intervene to restore the self-determination of that people, but
this was clearly not the case for the Iraqi intervention in Kuwait. Indeed, one of
the most striking features of the whole episode, and one that must inflect any
assessment of its legitimacy, is that none of the indigenous Kuwaiti population
welcomed the invasion, and few of the immigrant population did either. Even the
leaders of the Kuwait Bacthi Party, summoned to Baghdad to bless the invasion,
refused to do so; some have not been heard of since.38
Sovereignty has, however, been challenged in another way by this war, namely in
36
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the intervention, or safe haven policy, introduced after the war, which is an
infringement of Iraq's sovereignty and one that sets precedents for other countries
in the world. One can only imagine what a world would look like were this
generalized. Soon afterwards, in fact, related crises occurred in Bosnia and in
Somalia. Here, there is a dilemma in terms of established practice. On the one
hand, international law and not least the UN Charter place supreme value on the
principle of non-interference, of sovereignty in this sense. On the other hand, the
supremacy of sovereignty has been questioned in recent years, not only on grounds
of reality, as in the consequences of the growth of the EC or of the global
economy, but also on legal and moral grounds, and in particular with regard to
human rights questions. The UN itself has set up machinery, as has the EC, that in
some ways overrides the primacy of states, and public opinion in the developed
world has also moved in that direction. There is, moreover, historical precedent for
this, both in the ideas of Grotius or Kant about the validity of individuals as
against states, and in the justification of humanitarian intervention, i.e. intervention
against inhumanity, where extreme brutality has occurred.39 Beyond calculations of
the cost and international consequences, at least two ethical criteria are suggested
here: 1) the assent of the people on whose behalf the intervention is said to occur;
2) an extreme degree of oppression. Neither criterion is, of course, without its
ambiguities and problems.40
There can be little doubt that in the case of the safe haven the Kurds welcomed
this move: indeed, they subsequently held free elections where all candidates
supported the policy. Saddam's regime was certainly oppressive, by any standards,
and what we have learnt since about the 1988 genocide of the Kurds—operation
anfal—only confirms this.41 It is at least arguable that the majority of the Iraqi
people would also have welcomed a complete US occupation, i.e. the 'Japanese
solution'. Three other issues remain unresolved here. First, how does one ascertain
that 'extreme' brutality has occurred, i.e. what degree, for what percentage of the
population, in what areas? Second, even if one can agree, how often can such a
moral right or obligation be implemented? It will, of necessity, be selective. Third,
there is the issue, present in much earlier discussion, of how far intervention is
legitimate when carried out by an interested power. The Vietnamese invasion of
Cambodia in 1979 and that of the United States in Grenada in 1983 were both
welcomed by the peoples of those countries and would appear to meet Mill's
criteria on the oppressiveness of the regimes concerned, but they were condemned
by one bloc or the other because of charges of self-interest in a Cold War context.
The Cold War is over, but the issues of self-interest will not go away, as debates on
Bosnia and Somalia have shown.
The problem of motivation and interest prevails throughout discussion of the
war and intervention and is raised most clearly in the third of the moral issues I
want to discuss, namely that of just war. For some the very concept of 'just war' is
an abomination, in that it permits discussion of war itself; but unless one adopts a
39
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consistent pacifist position, itself a position on the legitimacy of war, one has to
engage with this category. For too many, 'justice' is defined to suit political
convenience. Many of those on the Left most opposed to the war and to any
measured discussion of its justice would, in other contexts, have defended the right
of, for example, oppressed peoples to use force in wars of national liberation and
revolutions; conversely many of those who favoured the war would have denied the
right of revolutionary and nationalist movements to take up arms in revolt. Indeed,
much of the public argument on the war mixed up analytic questions, of fact and
probability, with moral discussion. Such discussions also blurred the distinction
between jus ad helium, the right to go to war, and jus in bello, the right conduct of
the war itself. The argument against the Gulf War was, in broad terms, both that
the allies had no right to wage it and that they conducted it in an illegal or criminal
way. In other words, there was neither jus ad bellum nor jus in bello.
The argument on justice in going to war usually focuses on three questions: just
cause, competent authority, and right intention. Saddam himself claimed just cause in
several respects: that Kuwait was de jure part of Iraq anyway, that he had been
invited in, and that Kuwait had harmed his interests. If the first two are simply
spurious, the last is more interesting because it was, of course, regarded as a quite
legitimate reason for going to war until this century. Britain's occupation of Egypt in
1882 and its threats against Venezuela in 1902, for example, were because of debt
defaults. If Saddam was not justified, it is in part because there has been a change of
international norm or regime. Yet the regime has not changed that much, since if war
is not acceptable as a recourse in such cases, it is certainly still regarded as legitimate
to impose economic and diplomatic sanctions on countries which have harmed
another state's economic interests, or nationalized without compensation, or failed to
repay their debts, or on those which adopt unfair trading policies. Saddam was in this
respect not so out of line with international norms, although it could certainly be said
that his response to the economic harm caused was disproportionate.
While the question of just cause on the anti-Iraqi side hinges mainly on the issue
of sovereignty, that of competent authority turns on the legitimacy of the Kuwaiti
government's appeal for help and on the role of the UN, the latter clearly raising
the issue of great power involvement. Many said the UN action was illegitimate
because the Security Council acted at the behest of the United States, but it would
seem that an ideal criterion is being invoked here.42 The UN charter itself
recognizes the prominent role of the five permanent members, who are under
Article 24 given prime responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security. Indeed in the light of what has happened since, for example in
ex-Yugoslavia, one might well criticize them for failing to meet this obligation and
thereby forfeiting their right to their permanent seats. In the case of the Gulf, there
is no doubt that the United States led and cajoled the vote through the UN, but all
politics, domestic and international, probably involves an element of this. The issue
which is most difficult, and raises the greatest questions, is right intention.
All sorts of justifications of high-minded kind were given by the United States
for the war: protecting the sovereignty of Kuwait, restoring the al-Sabah to power,
ensuring the supply of oil, protecting other countries in the Middle East. In reply,
42
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the critics suggested other motives: the defence of monopolistic Western oil
interests, the protection of tribal oligarchies, the desire of the United States to
subordinate its commercial rivals in Europe and Japan, the equal desire of the
United States to intimidate the Third World by an exemplary action, the wish to
overcome the 'Vietnam syndrome' and offset the peace dividend, the need for
President Bush to distract attention from domestic problems, his desire for
re-election. One can accept that all of these seem plausible motives, and we would
need to know more than any archives or retrospective interviews and memoirs can
tell us to exclude any one of them. However, this does not settle the argument,
which is in the end not mainly about facts; rather we may need a more elaborated
conception of right intention to discuss the matter.
An exploration of the differences between the morality of states and that of
individuals was, of course, one of the central concerns of E.H. Carr in his Twenty
Years' Crisis, and it is worth bearing in mind here. Firstly, it is probably always
misguided to try and pin down one motive for any major act of foreign policy:
discussion of such classic cases as the US decision to drop the bomb on Hiroshima
in 1945, or of Khruschev's stationing of missiles in Cuba in 1962, is bedevilled by
this false starting point. States, like individuals, act for a mixture of motives and
one has to come to some plausible judgement not of the one, 'key', motive, but of
what the balance of motives was.43 The considerations identified by critics of the
US role were not the only motives of such a commitment and do not automatically
discredit the war the Allies fought.44
Secondly, in states, as opposed to individuals, self-interest does not necessarily
disqualify the morality of an action, even if it looms large as a motive: defending
US security, indeed defending the stability of the international oil market, may not
be such a nefarious consideration, given the political and economic consequences of
this not being done. In the late twentieth century, secure and reasonably priced oil
is as important a component of stable democratic politics as cheap wheat was in
the late nineteenth century; this does not justify oil company profits, but it does
suggest a general interest in oil.
Thirdly, while we need not assess morality solely in consequentialist terms, some
of the evaluation of right intention has to be based on consequences, for states and
for individuals; the restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty was, if an acceptable aim,
such a result, as was the containment and domestic weakening of Saddam. Yet even
if one argues that states do things solely for reprehensible motives, their actions
may be defensible. The Second World War provides an obvious example: Churchill
fought it to preserve the British Empire; Stalin to protect the Soviet dictatorship;
Roosevelt, somewhat less basely, to prosecute US hegemonic competition in the
Far East with the Japanese.45
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Finally, and equally in the realm of consequences, it has to be said that whether
or not some of the baser or more self-interest motives were present in President
Bush's mind, they proved to be ill-founded: the United States did not become more
interventionist in the Third World, no significant advantages accrued vis a vis
Western Europe and Japan, and, of course, Bush failed to get re-elected. In these
respects, at least, the consequences were soon shown to be rather less pernicious
than originally feared.
We now turn to the even more contentious question of jus in bello where Western
arguments, though often valid in substance, tend to be unduly complacent. Both
sides stand accused of violating this aspect of just war theory. On the Iraqi side the
allegation pertains to its treatment of civilian populations and POWs and to
deliberate ecological destruction in the final days of the war.46 The Iraqis certainly
did treat the population in Kuwait badly, and looted and spoliated Kuwait, though
not by any means as badly as many others in modern times have done: there was
no genocide, mass execution or 'scorched earth'. Allied POWs were beaten up and
ill-treated but none were tortured or killed; Iraqi treatment of them compares well
with that of the United States in Vietnam, where torture, shooting, even ejection
from helicopters, as well as the mutilation of corpses, were widespread.47 Some of
the ecological damage the Iraqis were accused of, such as flooding the Gulf with
oil, was greatly and possibly deliberately exaggerated at the time.48 But what is
indisputable is that the Iraqis blew up over 600 oil fields in Kuwait before leaving,
with great, though again limited, damage to the atmosphere and to the territory of
Kuwait itself. What was, however, most striking in this regard was the lack of
historical perspective with which this question was treated: what the Iraqis did was
in a strict sense new, but ecological crimes in war were far from new, e.g. the
destruction of forests and land in World War I, the usage of Agent Orange by the
United States for defoliation in Vietnam, not to mention the detonation of atom
bombs in Japan and in subsequent nuclear testing.49 Here the claim of novelty in
Saddam's criminality masked a moral amnesia that was rather too convenient for
the Western states involved.
The charge of illegitimate practice in the war itself levelled against the West—one
that would pertain also to the issue of right intention—rests upon a series of
incidents in which, it is claimed, excess force was used: the B-52 'carpet bombing'
of Iraqi troops prior to the ground offensive, the missile attack on the Amariya
Adam Roberts, 'The Gulf War and the Environment' The Oxford International Review, 4 (Summer
1993), pp. 13 18.
On the mutilation of enemy dead by US forces in Vietnam, see Michael Herr, Dispatches (London,
1979) p. 161. On the starving to death of German POWs after World War II, see James Bacque,
Other Losses (Toronto, 1990).
There are two uncertaintities surrounding the spillage of oil from tankers and pumping stations.
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shelter in Baghdad, the destruction of electricity generating plants and water
pumping stations in Iraq which caused protracted suffering to the civilian popu-
lation, and the strafing of Iraqi forces retreating from Kuwait to Basra. Here some
of what was claimed in criticism of the war would seem to be unfounded: in
contrast to Vietnam, there was no massive bombing campaign to push Iraq 'back
to the stone age' or to cause mass civilian casualties, and in the main allied
targeting was selective and accurate. The Amariya shelter was clearly a mistake,
and a reprehensible one, but not part of a broader pattern: it was not unreasonable
to have thought it was a dual use (civilian and military) installation. The
destruction of the civilian electricity generating plants had a legitimate military
purpose, to disrupt Iraqi military communications, but it was in retrospect
excessive and unnecessary. In any case, from all we know, it failed to meet its
objectives, since the Iraqis had a well-developed system of landlines powered by
their own small generators. The shootings on the road to Basra fell clearly within
the legitimate use of force against combatants as defined in international law:
soldiers who are in retreat but have not surrendered are not exempt from attack
and never have been so considered.50 Equally to the point is the fact that those
soldiers were returning to be used by Saddam against his own people, who were
then in a state of imminent insurrection.51 The logic of those who support that
insurrection, let alone who criticize Bush for not having gone further into Iraq and
ousted Saddam, is that the US President should have killed more, not fewer, Iraqi
troops when they were still inside Kuwait. As we have seen, the key moment in the
whole crisis was probably the realization by Saddam just prior to the start of
Desert Storm that the Americans would not go after him, thus enabling him to pull
his forces back from Kuwait with what were, despite the shootings on the Basra
road, rather low casualties. Mistakes were made by the coalition in targeting and
execution, but it is hard, given what we now know, to make a strong case that on
grounds of jus in bello the war was unjust.
While analytically separate from the issue of jus ad helium, jus in bello is
pertinent to it in that in some general way violation of the one prejudices the case
for the other. Much discussion of the war, on both sides, tried to use violations real
or alleged of the jus in bello to argue against a jus ad bellum case for the war, but
this is a less simple matter than such arguments imply. Here again we come up
against the lack of adequate criteria: how much violation of jus in bello cancels out
what would, a priori, be a just war on jus ad bellum grounds? Did Hiroshima and
Dresden invalidate the justice of the Allied cause? Did acts of assassination and
terror undermine the rights of national liberation movements? Almost always what
we see is that violations of jus in bello are used for polemical reasons to bolster an
argument that begins with jus ad bellum, just as conversely acts of atrocity are
justified on the grounds that the overall cause is just. The conclusion would seem
to be that there needs to be a much more careful separation of the two: crimes in
50
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bello do not easily cancel a case ad bellum, just as a right ad bellum does not easily
legitimate acts in bello.52
Ironically, one of the strongest moral arguments against the allied conduct of the
war was not that it used excessive force, but that it did not use enough. It is one of
the curiosities of the public debate on this whole conflict that many of those who
are strongest in making this charge, that Bush should have gone further, are the
same people who argued that he should not have gone to war in the first place.
Conclusions
In retrospect, this war, historically unique in several respects, can also be seen to
have put considerable strain on some conceptions of International Relations, and
to have involved a set of paradoxes. It was an explosion of the oldest style of
inter-state military conflict, at the moment when the world was breathing a sigh of
relief after the end of the Cold War and hoping such crises were a thing of the past.
It raised the question of sovereignty and intervention in a two-headed way, first in
the context of Iraq's claims to Kuwait and to leadership of the Islamic and Arab
worlds, then in the historic whiplash of UN and Western intervention in northern
Iraq. It provoked widespread opposition that at times seemed to argue both that
war against Iraq should not have been started and that the war that was fought
was invalid because it did not go far enough.
Where does this analysis leave the study of international relations? We can draw
two conclusions about the relation of the academic study to the broader process of
international politics. In the first place, the crises and changes of international
relations challenge us to apply, revise, and on occasion overthrow our established
concepts. Beyond the intrinsic intellectual discipline involved, the two great criteria
for the relevance of what we teach are the extent to which our concepts can 1)
explain events in the world and 2) enable us to refine the moral judgements that we
make about it. The Gulf War presents challenges of exactly that kind: it did not
provoke the need for a 'scientific revolution' in the teaching of IR, but it did test
parts of the intellectual system. As we have seen, there are elements of discomfort
or anomalies, for all three major paradigms in what occurred, as for feminism and
even more so for postmodernism. On a whole range of analytic and normative
questions, the war raised issues central to our subject, and nowhere more so than
on the ethical ones we have identified, particularly the importance of sovereignty,
the new precedent for intervention, and the need to refine our conception of right
intention.
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This crisis also highlighted a second kind of relationship between the academic
study of IR on the one hand and the events of the world and the formulation of
judgements and policy on the other. This is the pertinence of what we teach to the
handling of such crises themselves and to public debate. Such a relationship has at
times been corrupt, often trivial, and sometimes naive. Yet there can be a
relationship of independent and critical assessment, one separate from the dictates
of power but not innocent or careless about them, which the academic teaching of
IR can properly have; such a relationship was certainly not foreign to E.H. Carr.
If anything comes out of the Gulf crisis and of much of the public discussion of it,
it is how confused, short-sighted, and lacking in historical, comparative, or
conceptual depth much of this public debate is. We should recall the superficiality
of much of the discussion of sovereignty, legitimacy, and intervention, and the
confusion between jus ad bellum and jus in bello, that marked the public debate. All
social sciences have, as part of their job the clarification and the improvement of
public debate on the issues they study; in our field the degree of irrationality,
rhetoric and sheer muddle-headedness is probably greater than any other. What-
ever its other failings, few can say that the area of international relations and the
crises it has provoked, and will continue to provoke, are not important for the
public and the world as a whole. If nothing else, the Gulf crisis showed those of us
who teach and research in the field of IR that we have a job, indeed several jobs,
to do.
